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Abstract 
Paid maternity leave’s effect on women’s real wage growth is indeterminate in theory. 
Paid maternity leave could help a woman return to the same job postpartum, reducing the 
unemployment in between jobs (which we see as external leaves). Simultaneously, paid 
maternity leave could incentivize women to take more leave within a job (which we see as 
internal leaves). According to the human capital theory, if more women increase leave-taking 
due to the subsidy on leave and the cheaper opportunity cost of pregnancy, women’s overall 
productivity will decline and their wage growth will slow down. This analysis uses the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY-79) to investigate which one of the two opposing 
effects of paid maternity leave prevails. Our empirical findings suggest that holding all else 
equal, an increase in leave-taking led to a bigger decrease in the real wage growth for women 
who did not receive paid maternity leave compared to women who did receive paid maternity 
leave.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Currently in the United States of America (U.S.), an employee is entitled to take up to 12 
weeks of unpaid leave for the birth and care of a newborn child. The Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA), enacted in 1993, guarantees the entitlement for employees working at a workplace 
with 50 or more employees. The goal is to help parents achieve a healthy balance between “their 
work and family responsibilities by allowing them to take reasonable unpaid leave” (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1993).  
While FMLA establishes the foundation of parental leave policy in the U.S., several 
opinions exist to implement changes to the act. One opinion believes that FMLA should make 
the shift from guaranteeing unpaid leaves to paid leaves. Four states have made this shift to 
administer monetary benefits to individuals who take leaves to care for newborns: California, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and New York.  A second opinion, however, disagrees with 1
providing benefits for the leaves, arguing that a presence of paid leaves will incentivize 
individuals to increase leave-taking, thus hurting their work productivity. 
The debate concerns women who desire to have children since, relative to men, giving 
birth puts more physical and psychological strain on women. The term maternity leave describes 
the leave a woman takes to give birth and recover from the experience. FMLA and vacation days 
are two avenues through which women take time off from work, prepartum and postpartum. 
Whether or not maternity leaves should be supplemented with pay affects fertility rates and, 
more importantly for this thesis’s focus, the wage growth of women. 
1 Refer to table 1 for more details. 
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Proponents who support implementing paid maternity leave argue that the benefits will 
help women. A paid maternity leave alleviates the financial burden childbirth places on mothers 
who leave work to give birth and recover physically. A paid maternity leave policy also helps 
mothers to continue in the jobs held prepartum. By continuing with the same job postpartum, 
women re-enter the labor market at a wage similar to what she was earning before the leave. 
With a paid maternity leave policy, the woman decreases her unemployment between jobs all the 
way to zero. 
Opponents, however, counter that such an implementation will hurt women. The presence 
of a paid maternity leave policy incentivizes more women to get pregnant and take leaves from 
the job more often. Leave-taking deteriorates the worker’s productivity, regardless of the gender. 
Thus, the argument predicts that the mother wage penalty will increase as a result to more 
women taking more maternity leaves from work. Another point is that the employer, although 
not necessarily required to compensate for the benefits themselves, a) must bear the training 
costs of the replacement worker and b) will hire less women to anticipate women’s higher 
chance of a career interruption. Consequently, the female labor force will decrease, hurting 
women’s overall financial autonomy as a group. 
From a theoretical perspective, a paid maternity leave’s overall effect is indeterminate 
due to two opposing forces. Both the opponents and proponents’ main concern is how a paid 
maternity leave subsidizes leave-taking and reduces the opportunity costs of a pregnancy. They 
differ in opinion as to which which of the following effects will prevail.  
Paid maternity leave has a negative effect on women’s employment and wage growth 
because it will induce leave-taking within the same job. The leave-taking within the same job can 
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be viewed us internal leave-taking. The subsidy for internal leave-taking and lower opportunity 
cost associated with pregnancy will increase the demand for leave-taking within the same job. 
Subsequently, an employee’s productivity and wage growth will decrease compared to someone 
who did not take a leave.  
Paid maternity leave also has a positive effect on women’s employment and wage growth 
because it will decrease unemployment between different jobs. The unemployment between 
different jobs can be seen as external leave-taking. Without access to paid maternity leave, a 
woman risks losing her job or quits completely together in order to give birth. With the guarantee 
that the woman will not lose her job for taking a leave, she will be incentivized to return to the 
same job postpartum and utilize her firm-specific knowledge. The return to the same job 
decreases her external leave-taking.  
This empirical paper analyzes the net effect that paid leave-taking can have on the real 
wage evolution. Leave-taking, according to the human capital model, will always be detrimental 
to productivity and the real wage growth because it disrupts capital accumulation. If, however, 
the positive effect of paid leave-taking prevails, then leave-taking will have a less negative effect 
on the real wage growth for mothers who took a paid leave than for mothers who took an unpaid 
leave. If the negative effect of paid leave-taking prevails, then leave-taking will have a more 
negative effect on the real wage growth for mothers who took a paid leave than for mothers who 
took an unpaid leave. For our study, group A is the sample of mothers took paid leaves, and 
group B is the sample of mothers who did not take paid leaves.  
Our decision to focus on the mothers derives from multiple reasons. Firstly, the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY-79) does not gather data on paternity leaves. It 
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would be ideal to compare the different effects of paternity and maternity leaves on wage 
growth, but the lack of data does not allow this analysis. Secondly, there is a general recognition 
that the mother wage gap disproportionately accounts for the gender wage gap that persists 
today. Blau and Kahn (2017) finds “considerable empirical evidence [that] indicates a negative 
relationship between children and women’s wages, commonly known as the motherhood wage 
penalty.” This analysis will contribute directly to the discussion on the motherhood wage penalty 
and contribute indirectly to that of the gender wage gap.  
Thirdly, paid maternity leave is a topic that is increasingly receiving attention across 
North America. This investigation is crucial in today’s age when the conversation of 
implementing paid parental leave policies (for both mothers and fathers) is gaining momentum. 
The Canadian province of Quebec, for example, has recently begun to offer paid parental leave 
tailored for fathers. New York became the fourth state to implement a paid parental leave policy 
on January 1, 2018. With several states considering implementation, it is important to investigate 
the effects paid maternity leave policies may have. 
Paid maternity leave is an intriguing topic to study because similar to that of abortion, the 
discussion of paid maternity leave concerns life and population of the planet. Providing paid 
maternity leave has been shown to correlate with boosts in birth rates and population growth 
(Risse 2006). Since this paper focuses on the U.S., I will leave other researchers to grapple with 
the question of the nation’s role in the global population growth and exclude the effect of paid 
maternity leave on U.S. fertility rates. I am mainly concerned with the economic impact paid 
maternity leave has on females’ long run wage.  
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We begin the paper with chapter 2 which states the contribution of this thesis to the 
literature on paid maternity leave. Chapter 2 also establishes the hypotheses we will be testing 
with our empirical analysis. Chapter 3 then discusses the history of paid family policies and its 
potential effects on women’s wage growth. Chapter 4, then, outlines the existing papers that are 
dominant in the discussion about paid maternity leave. The paper continues with Chapter 5, 
which establishes the empirical model that we will build and explains the NLSY data we use in 
detail. Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical results we find and explains why we take the steps 
we take in our statistical analysis. Chapter 7 is the conclusion that discusses the implications of 
the empirical results. I situate the implementation of paid maternity leave within the context of a 
social discourse in the U.S.  
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Chapter 2: My Thesis Contribution 
My thesis contributes to the discussion surrounding paid maternal leave policies by 
conducting a national level analysis to test the theoretically-indeterminate effect of paid 
maternity leave on the real wage growth. Paid maternity leave would have a negative effect on 
the real wage growth if the negative effect of increased internal leave-taking prevails. However, 
if the positive effect of decreased external leave-taking prevails, paid maternity leave would have 
a positive effect on the real wage growth.  
For the analysis, our null hypothesis states that paid leaves and unpaid leaves have the 
same negative effect on the real wage growth. 
 H​o​: |​β​1A​| ​ ​= |β​1B​| [2.1] 
In other words, the negative effect of paid leave due to increased internal leave-taking cancels 
out the positive effect of paid leave due to decreased external leave-taking. The cancellation of 
the effects implies that paid leave policy has no significant effect over the real wage growth of 
women. For our analysis, leave is measured as total weeks of gap from work in the year 
(​weeksgap). ​β​1​ is the coefficient of ​weeksgap​, which is the amount of weeks of annual work 
absence.  
Our alternate hypothesis states that unpaid leaves have a more negative effect on the real 
wage growth than paid leaves do. 
 H​a​:​ ​|​β​1A​| ​ ​< |β​1B​| [2.2] 
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The alternate hypothesis is true if the positive effects of paid leave due to decreased external 
leave-taking is greater the negative effects due to increased external leave-taking. 
For this analysis, we do not use the Cox test or other approaches to test the joint 
hypotheses. Our null hypothesis involves coefficients from two non-nested models. Pesaran and 
Weeks (1999) define non-nested models as models that “belong to ‘separate’ families of 
distributions, in the sense that none of the individual models may be obtained from the 
remaining” by parameter restrictions. Ideally with non-nested hypotheses, one would utilize the 
modified (centered) log-likelihood ratio procedure (the Cox test) or other tools to conduct a 
statistical analysis. Because we lack the mathematical background to do so, we will simply 
compare the magnitudes of β​1A​ and β​1B​ across the non-nested models. Because of the simple 
comparison of the magnitudes, we do not know if the null hypothesis could be rejected with 
statistical significance if the null hypothesis ends up being incorrect.  
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Chapter 3: Paid Family Policies 
In 1978, the US government passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, protecting women 
against employers’ discrimination based on her pregnancy status. The act prohibits employers 
from rejecting or firing a woman due to her pregnancy (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 2009). The act further mandates that employers provide paid leave for pregnancy 
and childbirth if the firm has an existing disability program for other medical disabilities (Morris, 
Calvert, and Williams 2015). Employers who do not have an existing disability program, 
however, can choose not to provide paid leave for pregnancy and childbirth (Brake and 
Grossman 2014). Additionally, the anti-discrimination act does not guarantee that the medical 
condition of pregnant women requires breaks and/or temporary assignments to “lighter” duties. 
Because of these shortcomings of the act, several states are passing their own laws to ensure that 
pregnant women are protected, going as far as to provide periods of paid leave (Schulte 2014). 
While most of its industrialized counterparts provide mothers and fathers with rights to a 
paid leave upon childbirth, “the United States is one of the only two nations (the other being 
Papua New Guinea) that do not guarantee paid maternity leave to new mothers” (Baum and 
Ruhm 2016). The FMLA was enacted in 1993, requiring employers with at least 50 employees to 
provide up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave (Ruhm 2011). Currently, California, New Jersey, 
Rhode Island, and New York stand as the only states in the US that have implemented paid 
parental leave laws in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2018 respectively.  
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Table 1: Four States’ Paid Leave Laws 
State Coverage/Eligibility Nature of Paid Leave To Care For 
California 
(2004) 
Employee must have 
worked for employer 
for ≥1 year with ≥1250 
hours of service. 
Paid leave is up to 6 
weeks with 55% of 
employee’s weekly 
wage, from a minimum 
of $50 to a maximum 
of $1067, funded 
through employee-paid 
payroll taxes and 
administered through 
the state’s disability 
program.  
Child, spouse, parent, 
or domestic partner. 
New Jersey 
(2009) 
Employee must have 
worked ≥20 calendar 
weeks or have earned 
≥1000 times the state 
minimum wage ($8.60) 
during the 52 weeks 
before the leave. 
Paid leave is up to 6 
weeks with 66% of 
employee’s weekly 
wage, with a maximum 
of $524. Leaves could 
be paid, unpaid, or a 
combination. 
Child, spouse, parent, 
domestic partner, 
parent-in-law, and 
grandparent.  
Rhode Island 
(2014) 
All private sector 
employers and public 
sector employers who 
opt into the paid leave 
program. 
Paid leave is 4 weeks 
for the birth, adoption 
or fostering and up to 
30 weeks of paid leave 
for an employee’s 
disability, providing a 
minimum benefit of 
$72 and maximum of 
$752 per week, 
depending on earnings. 
The program is funded 
by employee payroll 
taxes and administered 
through the state’s 
temporary disability 
program.  
Child, spouse, parent, 
domestic partner, 
parent-in-law, and 
grandparent.  
Continues on the next page 
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Table 1 cont’d: 
New York 
(2018) 
All private employers 
must cover their 
employees, full-time or 
part-time. Employee 
must have worked ≥26 
consecutive weeks. 
As of 2018, the 
maximum leave 
allowed for a period of 
52 weeks is 8 weeks. In 
2019, the maximum 
leave period will be 10 
weeks, and in 2021, the 
period will be 12 
weeks. The benefit 
amount is 50% of an 
employee’s average 
weekly wage or 50% of 
the state weekly wage 
($540 as of 2018). It 
will increase to be 55% 
in 2019, 60% in 2020, 
and 67% in 2022.  
Child, spouse, parent, 
domestic partner, 
parent-in-law, 
grandparent, 
step-parent, or someone 
who is in the place of a 
parent of the employee. 
 
The design of the paid parental leave policies, however, play an important role at 
determining which parent takes the leave for a heterosexual couple. Not only are maternity 
leaves more widely available than paternity leaves, women take family-related leaves 
disproportionately more than their male counterparts even under a shared parental system 
because they have traditionally been the focus of work-family policies (O’Brien 2013). In light 
of this, countries such as Norway, Sweden, Germany, Iceland, and Canada have adopted paid 
leaves policies to encourage fathers to take leaves through a father’s quota or “daddy leave” 
(Patnaik 2016). Patnaik (2016) finds that in the Canadian province of Quebec, the father’s quota 
“​increased fathers' participation rates by 250% and leave duration by 3 weeks.”​ ​Such policies 
typically provide a quota of days solely for the father upon the birth of a child. The focus on 
fathers may encourage heterosexual couples to break away the traditional division of labor that 
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stunts mothers’ wage growth but leaves fathers’ unharmed by placing mothers in the home for 
childcare.  
While the Pregnancy Discrimination Act guarantees that women do not lose their jobs 
due to pregnancy, it does not protect women from statistical discrimination of employers during 
hiring. In addition, FMLA and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act exempt all small companies 
from abiding. In the case of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, a firm with fewer than 15 
employees do not have to abide by it (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2008). 
These are factors to keep in mind while reading this paper, because they significantly affect the 
long run real wage evolution of women. For the purpose of this thesis, however, employer 
discrimination is not an area of focus. Regardless, we acknowledge that in this day and age, the 
gender wage gap will only converge when we place the same level of expectation regarding 
childcare on both mothers and fathers (Miller 2018).  
  
14 
Chapter 4: Literature Review 
There is a significant amount of literature analyzing the gender wage gap in the US 
market. Mincer and Polachek (1974) use the human capital model to state that the wage gap is a 
result of women’s shorter, less continuous labor force participation due to events such as the 
arrival of a child. Thus, the arrival of a child is the core of the human productivity model’s 
explanation for the gender earning gap. A leave of any nature would disrupt the women’s labor 
force participation and hurt her long run wage evolution. The career interruption disrupts 
accumulation of labor market experience and job training. After returning from the pregnancy 
leave, the woman is supposedly not as productive as before she left. This is likely to be more 
evident with human capital intensive occupations (such as doctors and professors) than labor 
intensive occupations (such as waiters and janitors).  
In support of Mincer and Polachek’s finding, Becker (1985) finds that women are more 
likely to work part time and discontinuously compared to men due to childbearing and traditional 
division of labor. Before the child’s actual arrival, women expecting a shorter career life possess 
less incentives to invest in education and job-specific training, placing their human capital level 
lower than women who do not have the same expectations. However, Becker (1993) admits that 
the situation is changing due to a general decrease in family size, increase in divorce rates, and 
the growth of the service sector, where most women seek employment. 
Blau and Kahn (2000) highlights the role of wage structure in the human capital model. 
“If, as the human capital model suggests, women have less experience than men, on average, the 
higher the return to experience received by workers, regardless of sex, the larger will be the 
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gender gap in pay” (Blau and Kahn 2000). Blau and Kahn extend this to segregation of 
occupation, stating that the higher the premium for working in the male sector, the larger the 
gender pay gap. In a self-claimed “merit-based” society, however, such a wage structure is not 
seen as problematic even if it perpetuates inequalities.  
While this paper focuses on paid maternity leaves’ effects on the real wage evolution, the 
demographic outcomes cannot be ignored. Although the human capital model predicts that 
taking a maternity leave could be detrimental to women’s real wage evolution relative to that of 
non-mothers (both men and women), existing literature suggests that paid maternity leave 
policies have a positive effect on birth outcomes. Stearns (2015) finds that in the US, “paid 
maternity leave reduces the share of low birthweight births by 3.2 percent” and “decreases the 
likelihood of early term births [which occur after 37-38 weeks of gestations opposed to full term 
births which occur at 39-40 weeks] by 6.6 percent.” Essentially, Stearns’ finding implies that 
mothers for whom paid maternity leave is available have a healthier and less risky delivery 
process for both herself and her newborn.  
It is not the quality of the delivery process but also the quantity that are affected. Risse 
(2006) finds in Australia that “paid maternity leave has a statistically significant effect on the 
pregnancy rates of women,” suggesting that “national paid maternity leave legislation would 
encourage women to bring forward the timing of children and help to slow down the aging of the 
population.” Being a country with low fertility rates in comparison to similar nations, Australia 
aims to address this sensitive issue with multiple approaches such as the Fair Work Commission. 
This commission provides paid parental leave that administers a pay scheme for up to 18 weeks. 
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With an aging population of Baby Boomers, the US may want to take a couple of pages out of 
Australia’s book if the nation wants to prevent a declining population growth.  
While this paper investigates maternity leave’s effects on the real wage evolution of a 
mother, we recognize the health benefits of a leave. The physical and mental impacts childbirth 
can have are not to be ignored. McGovern et al. (1997) found that “for women taking more than 
12 weeks leave, time off work had a positive effect on vitality.” Their findings suggest that both 
physical and mental vitality benefit from time off, of which some subjects took more than 20 
weeks of. With the health benefits, however, comes a potential for economic consequences. 
Ruhm (1998) presents work on the economic consequences of parental leave mandates 
from Europe. The author argues that a) short periods (described as three months) of paid parental 
leave boost the ratio of women’s employment to that of the population while having a small 
effect on wages and b) longer periods (nine months) raise the ratio but lower hourly wages. 
Ruhm elegantly explains the dynamics of the labor market after a parental leave mandate:  
Parental leave mandates are likely to shift the labor supply curve of the groups 
most probable to use it to the right (relative to those workers less likely to take 
leave). The demand curve moves to the left… to the extent that nonwage costs 
(e.g., expenses associated with hiring and training temporary replacements) 
increase [if] leave benefit are paid primarily by the government. (Ruhm 1998)
 
After conducting his analysis, he finds that paid leave is positively related to the percentage of 
females employed and negatively related to relative wages the lengthier the entitlement. He 
proposes three possible reasons why rights to extended parental leave may reduce wages. First, 
he states that the demand for labor is inelastic (around -0.3), “implying that a 1 percent rise in 
labor supply will reduce wages by more than 3 percent” (Ruhm 1998). Second, the absences 
from work impose significant nonwage costs on firms via searching costs for replacement 
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workers. Third, women who were “baby-bunching” (i.e. giving birth consecutively to minimize 
time away from work) before the leave mandate may now bunch less than before, causing a 
higher depreciation of human capital.  
There is evidence to suggest that baby-bunching decreases the effect that additional births 
have on the mother’s labor market involvement and wage growth. Troske and Voicu (2013) find 
in their analysis that reducing the birthgap (interval between births) “reduce the effect of children 
on labor supply--the main component of the opportunity cost of children--which, in turn, reduces 
losses due to forgone wages, forgone human capital investments, and human capital 
depreciation.” If Ruhm (1998) is correct in his postulation that leave mandate may reduce 
baby-bunching, a paid maternity leave could further reduce baby-bunching. The reduction in 
baby-bunching, in turn, could have a negative effect on women’s, specifically mother’s, labor 
market involvement and real wage growth.  
Joesch’s (1997) report investigates the relationship between having access to paid leave, 
the exit from work, and the reentry to work in the U.S. She finds evidence to challenge the idea 
that paid maternity leave will incentivize women to take more leave time. In her study, women 
with access to paid maternity leave interrupted work later during pregnancy and reentered sooner 
once the child was at least 2 months old, ceteris paribus. The author concludes that “if the goal of 
a paid leave policy is to enable parents to spend time with their infants without giving up work,” 
then a paid leave that is longer can help but only up to a point (Joesch 1997).  
A more recent study by Hofferth and Curtin (2006) supports both Joesch and Ruhm’s 
works. Hofferth and Curtin investigate mothers’ postpartum employment patterns and wages 
before and after the 1993 FMLA. Agreeing with Joesch, they find that women who had a child 
18 
after FMLA rebounded more quickly and were more likely to continue with the same job as 
before the leave. However, they found that the women who did not continue with the same job 
postpartum saw a decline in their wages, supporting Ruhm’s findings. Overall, Hofferth and 
Curtin’s results suggest that the FMLA boosted employment and retention among mothers but 
lowered wages.  
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Chapter 5: Empirical Model 
This paper utilizes the panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY-79). The survey began with 12,686 individuals aged 14 to 22, following them annually 
from 1979 and then biennially from 1994 until 2016. After accounting for missing observations 
due to non-interview and death and excluding males, we are left with 6,147 females, 4,931 of 
whom have had at least 1 child. The collected information concentrated on participants’ 
characteristics and their experiences in and out of the labor market. The focus of this thesis is on 
these 4,931 females from 5 years before and 25 years after the birth of their first child.  
As with most researchers who use data collected for purposes other than the research at 
hand, I found myself wishing for more data. The original vision of this investigation was to 
compare the impacts of a maternity leave vs. a paternity leave on wage evolution. The NLSY-79, 
however, does not collect any data on paternity leaves. For this reason, we are not able to pursue 
the original vision. Regardless, we believe our work does make a unique contribution to the 
existing literature due to its national perspective. 
A problem with panel data is the tendency to be deterministic or stochastic over time, 
leading to non-stationarity. With non-stationarity, we could see misspecification of results or 
spurious regressions, inflating the r-squared values and F- and t-statistics. Additionally, simple 
correlation coefficients are unreliable tools of measurement because of the data’s timespan of 37 
years. Furthermore, we need to account for numerous immeasurable factors that we assume to be 
invariant over time, such as risk adversity. For these reasons, we will utilize fixed effects 
generalized least squares regressions to build our model. In the next chapter, we provide 
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Hausman Tests that support our decision to choose a fixed effects model over one of random 
effects. 
 𝒚​𝒊𝒕​ = 𝜷𝒙 ​𝒊𝒕​ + 𝜶​𝒊𝒕​ + 𝑫​𝒊​ + 𝜺​𝒊𝒕  [5.1] 
 
 (𝒀)​𝒊𝒕​ = 𝒇[(​PC​)​𝒊𝒕​, (​NW​)​𝒊𝒕​, (​L​)​𝒊𝒕-1​, (​HK​)​𝒊𝒕​, log(​u​)​it​ ; 𝑫​𝒊​ ] + 𝜺​𝒊𝒕 [5.2] 
The dependent variable Y is log(real wage), and real wage will be taken from the primary 
job. Personal characteristics (PC) includes age, number of children, and the time between the 
birth of first child and the birth of the last. Because 7.68% of the observations possess 
information on industry and 7.76% on occupation, it is not possible to meaningfully account for 
industry on occupation. We hope that education acts as a proxy for the nature of the occupation 
of the women. That being said, human capital (HK) includes education. Leave (L) measures the 
amount of weeks not worked. Dummy variables (D​i​) account for several time variant exogenous 
variables such as the paid leave marker and marriage. D​i ​also includes year dummies to account 
for variation over time.  
For ease of reading, we remind the reader that the group of mothers who received paid 
leave in their lifetime will be referred to as group A, while the group of mothers who did not 
receive paid leave will be referred to as group B.  
Table 2: Referred to as 
Group of Mothers Referred to as 
Who Received Paid Leave Group A 
Who Did Not Receive Paid Leave Group B 
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Data 
As stated before, the analysis focuses on 4,931 females who have had at least had one 
child. From table 3, however, we can see that the number of mothers in the study fluctuates from 
year to year. The change in the number could not be due completely to death, since if it were the 
case, the number would decrease over time. However, the actual count of mothers of the study 
decreases and then increases for some years. This reflects a number of subjects who are not 
consistently responding to the surveys. The fluctuation then begs the question, how many 
individuals out of the total are actually reliable? The dubious nature of the fluctuation in subjects 
throughout the panel data is something the reader should keep in mind while reading this 
analysis.  
Table 3: Count of Mothers in the Study 
Year Group A Group B Total Change Year Group A Group B Total Change 
1979 1210 3721 4931 N/A 1992 1114 2680 3794 10 
1980 1182 3581 4763 -168 1993 1117 2698 3815 21 
1981 1190 3597 4787 24 1994 1087 2624 3711 -104 
1982 1187 3562 4749 -38 1996 1076 2593 3669 -42 
1983 1184 3604 4788 39 1998 1073 2555 3628 -41 
1984 1183 3585 4768 -20 2000 1029 2441 3470 -158 
1985 1171 3298 4469 -299 2002 981 2360 3341 -129 
1986 1152 3226 4378 -91 2004 1000 2372 3372 31 
1987 1154 3191 4345 -33 2006 986 2328 3314 -58 
1988 1144 3158 4302 -43 2008 1003 2354 3357 43 
1989 1168 3238 4406 104 2010 964 2317 3281 -76 
1990 1147 3181 4328 -78 2012 944 2248 3192 -89 
1991 1106 2678 3784 -544 2014 899 2189 3088 -104 
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Table 4 gives a description of the mothers during their lives when their first (or only) 
child is five years old. The timeline of the summary statistics, then, is not in terms of the 
calendar year but in terms of lifespan in relative to the birth of the first child. There are 2,163 
more mothers in group B then in group A when their first child is five years old. When observing 
the real wage, while group A’s minimum and maximum are both lower than those of group B, all 
quartiles are higher for group A compared to group B. The observation suggests two things. 
Firstly, while the minimum and maximum real wage earners of group B perform better than their 
group A counterparts, group A earns more as an overall group at the time in their lives when 
their first child is five years old. Secondly, more socioeconomic inequality may exist amongst 
group B members, as its positive outlier earns 8.19 more in real wage than its group A 
counterpart despite group A’s higher overall real wage.  
Both groups possess a majority of white mothers, followed by Black mothers and then 
Hispanic mothers. The race group “Others” includes Asians, Native Americans, and others. 
Group A is generally older than group B when giving birth to the first child, and compared to 
group B, a higher percentage of group A is married. While the majority of both groups are high 
school graduates, group A is more educated than group B in general, with higher percentages of 
group A for high school, college, and graduate school educations. 
While reading this summary statistics, the reader may ask “Are more members of  
group A highly educated, married, and older (which all signal stability) because they have 
received paid leave or have they received paid leave because they are highly educated, married, 
and older?” This is the typical “the egg or the chicken” dilemma that mankind has been 
grappling with since the beginning of time. Although this question of “which is the cause?” is 
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important, this seven month long undergraduate thesis does not have the time or the resources to 
even begin tackling this question. For this reason, we will put this question on the shelf for future 
research. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Mothers when First Child is 5 Years Old 
 Group A Group B 
Number of Females 888 3051 
Real Wage 
    Minimum 0.01 0.31 
    Quartile 1 11.2 8.27 
    Quartile 2 16.58 10.89 
    Quartile 3 23.79 14.55 
    Maximum 166.52 174.71 
Age 
    Minimum 19 18 
    Quartile 1 25 23 
    Quartile 2 29 25 
    Quartile 3 33 28 
    Maximum 50 47 
Race 
    Black 24.66% 27.11% 
    Hispanic 20.83% 15.80% 
    White 42.23% 43.20% 
    Other 12.27% 13.90% 
Education 
    Less than HS 6.19% 25.89% 
    High School 70.61% 66.73% 
    College 14.30% 5.24% 
    Masters/PHd 8.90% 2.13% 
Marital Status 
    Never Married 15.20% 23.70% 
    Married, Spouse Present 68.13% 59.46% 
    Separated/Divorced 16.67% 16.85% 
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Figure 1 plots out the median real wages across time for both groups. Time is not defined 
by the calendar year but by the age of the first child of the mothers. Time equals 0 for the year 
that the first child was born. The range for the time is [-5 , 25]. In figure 2, we plot a) the gap of 
median real wage and b) ratio of median real wage. For the chart of the gap, when y equals 0, it 
means that on average, there is no difference between group A’s median real wage and group B’s 
median real wage. For the chart of the ratio, when y equals 1, it implies that the median real 
wage of group A is equal to the median real wage of group B in a situation of median real wage 
parity. Figure 2 suggests that after 15 years of first child’s birth, there is a lot of noise in the data.  
Analyzing figure 1, we can gather that on average, women who received a paid leave 
earn a higher real wage throughout their life, regardless of race. In order to get information on 
the real wage difference between group A and group B, we analyze figure 2. The first chart of 
figure 2 shows that, on average, the real wage gap grows years prior to the birth of the first child, 
reflecting anticipation for childbirth. The gap growth slows down over time, but the following 
pattern persists for the most part: the gap is the largest between whites, followed by others, 
hispanics, and blacks. The second chart of figure 2 highlights how close or far parity is. The 
racial group that is closest to parity is black. However, we must remember the relevancy of 
achieving parity in the context where everyone in the group is earning lower than other groups.  
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 Figure 1: Comparison of Med Real wages Over Time Since Birth of First Child Across Race 
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 Figure 2: Gap of Med Real Wage and Ratio of Med Real Wage 
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Creation of Variables 
Weeksgap 
Weeksgap​ was created from the NLSY-79 variable “​WEEKSWORKED​,” which measured 
the amount of weeks out of the 52 work weeks the respondent has worked. For our purposes, we 
were interested in the effect a leave has on the real wage. Thus, we created ​weeksgap ​to more 
directly measure the relationship we are interested in. 
Numchildren and Birthgap 
NLSY-79 provides the variable called ​NUMCH​ which asks the respondent how many 
number of biological, step, and/or adopted children live in the respondent’s household. However, 
we are only interested in the biological children since step and adopted children do not require 
the same kind of leave from work a biological child would. For this reason, we use ​CxDOB​, 
which asks the respondent the date of birth of the respondent’s biological child. ​CxDOB​ captures 
up to 11 children, allowing us to measure up to 10 birthgaps. 
Birthgap​ measures the amount of years between the oldest and the youngest child, acting 
as a proxy to measure the mother’s intention to baby bunch by having more children in a shorter 
period of time to reduce the time away from work.  
Years of Education and Marital Status 
We created dummies for the three levels of education: less than high school, college, and 
Masters/PhD with high school graduates as the omitted reference group. Similarly, we created a 
dummy for marriage where it equals 1 if the respondent is married and equals 0 if the respondent 
is not married. 
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 Regional Unemployment 
NLSY-79 collects data on the respondent’s region of residence. This region has four 
categories: Northeast, South, Midwest, and West. We then gather regional unemployment data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. With the unemployment data in possession, we match the 
respondents with the unemployment rate according to their region of residence for the year. After 
each respondent has the appropriate unemployment, we created ​logu​ that takes the natural log of 
unemployment. 
Age 
Age was only asked in 1979, when all the respondents were within 14 to 19 years of age. 
This required us to modify the given age variable so that 
 age = age + (current year - 1979) [5.3] 
 to ensure that the variable keeps up with time. 
Real Wage   
Although NLSY-79 had information for respondents for up to 8 jobs, the data was not 
always reliable due to respondents skipping the questions without reason or not participating the 
interview at all for certain years. Furthermore, NLSY-79 only provided the nominal wages for up 
to 5 jobs, with respondents again not participating or skipping. For this reason, we decided to be 
safe with our data and chose to only use the nominal wage of job 1, the primary job for most 
respondents. 
With information of the national inflation rate gathered from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED),  we adjust the nominal wage to get the real wage. If we had more time, 
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we would have hunted for regional inflation data instead of national so that we could better 
adjust the nominal wage to reflect the circumstances of respondents more appropriately.  
After we calculate the real wage from the nominal wage, we created the dependent 
variable Y that takes the natural log of the real wage. We decided to take the natural log of the 
real wage because we are interested in the real wage growth. The natural log form of the 
dependent variable allows us to interpret the independent coefficients according to our interests.   
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Table 5: Definition of Variables 
Variable Created
? 
Definition 
Age Yes Age of individual 
Age​2 Yes Age of individual, squared 
Children Yes Number of biological children under age 18 years in 
household 
Weeksgap Yes Number of weeks not worked out of 52 work weeks during 
year t-1 
Numjobsyear No Number of jobs held during year t 
Birthgap Yes The amount of years between birth of first child and birth of 
last child divided by the number of biological children 
Birthgap*age Yes Interaction of birthgap and age 
Birthgap*age​2 Yes Interaction of birthgap and age​2 
logu Yes Log of average unemployment rate of the region for year t 
Educ Dummies 
➢ HS graduate 
➢ Less than HS 
➢ Some college 
➢ College 
➢ Masters/PhD 
 
Yes 
 
Omitted reference category for education 
1 if individual did not graduate from high school, 0 otherwise 
1 if individual received some college education, 0 otherwise 
1 if individual graduated from college, 0 otherwise 
1 if individual pursued further education post-college, 0 
otherwise 
Marriagedummy Yes Dummy that is 1 if individual is married, 0 otherwise 
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Chapter 6: Empirical Results 
Fixed effects Generalized Least Squares Regressions 
To account for time invariant variables that cannot be easily observed in the panel data 
and serial correlation over time, we opted for fixed effect generalized least squares regressions. 
Other invariant variables, such as race and gender, are also accounted for even though they are 
observable. Including these variables in a fixed effects model will result in the canceling out of 
the variable since there is no change over time for a person regarding their race and gender. For 
this reason, race and gender are not included in our models. We also point out that the fixed 
effects nature of the models would address, to a certain degree, misspecification, which is 
something all models are vulnerable to.  
Hausman Test 
To test our intuition that fixed effects regressions should be utilized, we use the Hausman 
test, whose null hypothesis is that the estimator from the random effects model is an efficient and 
consistent estimator of the true parameters, meaning that there is no systematic difference 
between the estimators of the fixed effects and random effects. Because the Hausman test cannot 
be conducted with robust standard errors, we used the models with their plain standard errors. 
After the Hausman test has been run, however, we analyze the seven models with their robust 
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity, which we will talk more about. For all models 
of both groups, we reject the Hausman tests, suggesting that using fixed effects regressions is 
more appropriate for this analysis.  
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Table 6: Hausman test for mothers’ models  2
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Group A reject reject reject reject reject reject reject 
Group B reject reject reject reject reject reject reject 
 
Correlation Coefficients 
In order to assess the strength and direction of the correlation between variables, we find 
the correlation coefficients between different pairs of variables we are interested in using. 
Considering that correlation coefficients measure the linear relationships between variables, we 
exclude any non-linear variables such as age​2​ and the interaction variables. Doing this, we find 
that ​weeksgap​ and ​numjobsyear​ form the only pair that possesses a correlation coefficient higher 
than 0.5. The model that possess both of these variables is model 5. 
Table 7: Correlation Coefficients 
 age educ logu marr num~ar pa~ve w~gap b~gap 
         
age 1        
educ 0.26 1       
logu -0.28 -0.1 1      
marr 0.16 0.19 -0.1 1     
num~year -0.21 0.15 0.09 -0.03 1    
paidleave 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 1   
weeksgap -0.2 -0.29 0.11 -0.08 -0.65 -0.04 1  
birthgap 0.48 -0.04 -0.2 0.1 -0.18 0.04 0.04 1 
2 See Appendix B for the Hausman tests. 
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Robust inference 
To address heteroskedasticity, we use robust inference for all the models. Given that 
group A has roughly 1000 participants and group B has roughly 25000 means we can safely 
assume that the sample is large enough for us to use robust standard errors confidently. We use 
the word roughly because the sample size varies from year to year as participants could not 
answer for certain years.  
Regressions 
The regression results are organized into two tables, one for group A and another for 
group B. Each group has 7 models, out of which model 1 is the most basic. All 14 regression 
results can be viewed in detail in Appendix A. 
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Table 9: Group A, robust se 
N = observations 27,537 27,732 27,537 27,732 
y=ln(realwage) model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 
weeksgap -0.0301*** -0.0301*** -0.0300*** -0.0303*** -0.0278*** -0.0302*** -0.0302*** 
 (-52.36) (-52.38) (-51.90) (-52.13) (-45.09) (-52.07) (-52.17) 
numchildren -0.0693*** -0.0719*** -0.0774***  -0.0762***   
 (-5.26) (-5.46) (-5.96)  (-5.90)   
Less than HS dum -0.1181*** -0.1182*** -0.0742* -0.0816* -0.0510 -0.0782* -0.0829* 
 (-3.53) (-3.53) (-2.24) (-2.47) (-1.55) (-2.35) (-2.48) 
College dum 0.3135*** 0.3067*** 0.2827*** 0.2951*** 0.2813*** 0.2936*** 0.2957*** 
 (9.29) (9.11) (8.31) (8.68) (8.23) (8.63) (8.69) 
Masters/PhD dum 0.3003*** 0.2915*** 0.2724*** 0.2859*** 0.2769*** 0.2870*** 0.2901*** 
 (6.26) (6.08) (5.69) (5.92) (5.77) (5.95) (6.02) 
logu -0.0348 -0.0362      
 (-0.53) (-0.56)      
marriagedummy  0.0304 0.0235 0.0094 0.0314* 0.0110 0.0133 
  (1.90) (1.50) (0.60) (2.00) (0.70) (0.85) 
age  0.0254*** 0.0797*** 0.0650*** 0.0846*** 0.0685*** 0.0636*** 
  (13.78) (5.76) (4.71) (6.06) (4.87) (4.39) 
age^2   -0.0008*** -0.0006** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0006** 
   (-3.92) (-3.19) (-4.16) (-3.39) (-2.88) 
birthgap    -0.0067  -0.0405 -0.2030* 
    (-0.98)  (-1.80) (-2.23) 
numjobsyear     0.0799***   
     (7.82)   
birthgap*age      0.0009 0.0095* 
      (1.39) (2.00) 
birthgap*age^2       -0.0001 
       (-1.83) 
constant 2.1211*** 1.6829*** 0.8641*** 1.0840*** 0.6306** 1.0376*** 1.1038*** 
 (17.34) (12.63) (4.34) (5.47) (3.11) (5.15) (5.35) 
R-sqr 0.3950 0.3952 0.3952 0.3935 0.3976 0.3936 0.3937 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 10: Group B, robust se 
N = observations 73,097 73,865 73,097 73,865 
y=ln(realwage) model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 
weeksgap -0.0328*** -0.0327*** -0.0327*** -0.0330*** -0.0264*** -0.0329*** -0.0329*** 
 (-122.23) (-121.88) (-121.96) (-124.04) (-83.39) (-122.85) (-122.69) 
numchildren -0.0912*** -0.0866*** -0.0928***  -0.0893***   
 (-11.48) (-10.96) (-11.73)  (-11.62)   
Less than HS dum -0.1153*** -0.1195*** -0.1059*** -0.1182*** -0.0765*** -0.1130*** -0.1149*** 
 (-6.08) (-6.28) (-5.46) (-6.12) (-4.00) (-5.87) (-5.97) 
College dum 0.1463*** 0.1604*** 0.1553*** 0.1571*** 0.1608*** 0.1564*** 0.1585*** 
 (4.30) (4.71) (4.54) (4.58) (4.75) (4.56) (4.62) 
Masters/PhD dum 0.2238*** 0.2414*** 0.2418*** 0.2350*** 0.2709*** 0.2398*** 0.2431*** 
 (5.40) (5.83) (5.86) (5.66) (6.46) (5.80) (5.87) 
logu -0.0239 -0.0242      
 (-0.50) (-0.51)      
marriagedummy  -0.0563*** -0.0610*** -0.0756*** -0.0455*** -0.0731*** -0.0708*** 
  (-5.15) (-5.58) (-6.93) (-4.22) (-6.73) (-6.51) 
age  0.0181*** 0.0456*** 0.0270** 0.0541*** 0.0325*** 0.0282** 
  (19.38) (5.18) (3.13) (6.09) (3.70) (3.17) 
age^2   -0.0004** -0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0003* -0.0002 
   (-3.13) (-1.44) (-3.70) (-2.17) (-1.59) 
birthgap    -0.0345***  -0.0897*** -0.2187*** 
    (-6.88)  (-5.74) (-4.40) 
numjobsyear     0.1875***   
     (33.12)   
birthgap*age      0.0015*** 0.0087** 
      (3.52) (3.27) 
birthgap*age^2       -0.0001** 
       (-2.75) 
constant 2.1057*** 1.7887*** 1.3650*** 1.6191*** 0.8238*** 1.5465*** 1.6051*** 
 (24.56) (20.31) (10.82) (13.12) (6.44) (12.33) (12.65) 
R-sqr 0.3947 0.3951 0.3946 0.3929 0.4085 0.3931 0.3932 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Interpretation of Coefficients  
Education and age 
For both groups, the seven models produced estimators with the expected signs for 
education, and age. According to all the models that incorporate age and age​2​, age has a marginal 
effect on real wage growth. The marginal effect increases at a decreasing rate over time. After a 
certain point in age, an increase in age leads to a decrease in the real wage growth. In order to 
calculate this point of age where age stops having a positive effect and starts having a negative 
effect, we find the points of age where the derivative of the regression function equals 0. If x 
represents age, then the marginal effect of age on real wage growth can be derived as follows. 
 Y = β​8​x + β​9​x​2 [6.1] 
 
 = β​8​ + 2β​9​xdx
dy  [6.2] 
If we set the derivative equal to 0, then 
 -2β​9​x = β​8 [6.3] 
 
 x = β​8​/(-2β​9​) [6.4] 
By plugging in the appropriate β​8​ and β​9​ from the 7 models for both groups, we can calculate the 
turning point where age begins having a negative effect on real wage growth. Below is a table 
indicating these turning points across models and groups. 
Table 11: Points of Age Where Marginal Effects of Age is Zero Across Models 
age model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 
Group A 49.81 54.17 52.88 48.93 53 
Group B 57 67.5 54.1 54.16 70.5 
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We see that group B members’ age stops having a positive effect and starts having a 
negative effect on the real wage growth later on in their lives when compared to group A 
members. This could be due to several factors. Group A members may decrease their workload 
earlier on in their lives and thus experience a decline in real wage growth earlier when compared 
to group B. Group A members may also experience positive real wage growth earlier on in their 
lives. If so, then group A members will experience the decreasing part of the marginal effects 
trajectory earlier in their lives than group B members. 
The coefficients for the education dummies indicate that higher education contributes 
more positively to the real wage of group A. Throughout all the models for group A, the 
coefficients for college and master/PhD dummies are higher while the coefficient for less than 
HS dummy is lower in comparison to group B. This suggests that a) the mothers from group A 
are self-selecting for higher-paying jobs than those applied by mothers from group B and/or  
b) group A and group B face circumstances in their lives that are not accounted for by the 
models.  
Numjobsyear 
Numjobsyear​ could have had a coefficient with either a negative sign or a positive sign. 
The coefficient would have been negative if the multiple jobs were not complementary, having a 
net negative effect on the ​realwage​ of the individual. For this sample of females, however, the 
coefficient for the variable ​numjobsyear​ is positive, implying that the jobs were complementary 
and beneficial to the primary real wage. Model 5 predicts that for both groups, an increase of 
total number of jobs held per year by one job leads to an increase in real wage: 8% for group A 
and 18.7% for group B.  
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Weeksgap and numchildren 
In all seven models, the variable ​weeksgap​ was negative and significant for both groups. 
For all models except model 5, the coefficients for group B were consistently larger in absolute 
value by 0.003, suggesting that a week increase in work absence has a more negative effect on 
real wage for group B than for group A. Similarly, relative to group A, the amount of children 
has a more negative effect on the real wage of group B. The biggest difference is with model 1 
where an increase of children by 1 child is expected to have a 6.9% decrease in real wage for 
group A and 9.1% for group B, and the smallest difference is with model 5 where an increase of 
children by 1 child is expected to have a 7.6% decrease in real wage for group A and 8.9% for 
group B.  
Marriagedummy 
The ​marriagedummy​’s coefficient is consistently negative and significant throughout the 
different models for group B, but it is only significant for group A in model 5, where it is 
positive. Model 5, which has the highest R-squared for both groups and has the only significant 
coefficient for ​marriagedummy​ for group A, predicts that compared to a woman who is not 
married, a married woman is expected to earn 4.6% less if she is from group B and 3.1% more if 
she is from group A. This outcome implies that women who received paid leaves benefit from 
marriage more than women who did not receive paid leave. This may be explained by positive 
assortative mating in marriage markets, “where high-quality men are matched with high-quality 
women and low-quality men with low-quality women” (Becker 1991). As for our analysis, the 
word “quality” can be replaced by “earning.” Our empirical results support Becker’s postulation: 
mothers of group A, being more educated as an overall group, are self-selecting and gravitating 
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towards more educated men who are high-earning, whereas mothers of group B, being less 
educated as an overall group, are gravitating towards men who earn less than the husbands for 
group A.  
Birthgap, birthgap*age, and birthgap*age​2 
The only model where all of the three variables concerning ​birthgap​ are significant is 
model 7. If x represents ​birthgap​, then the marginal effect of ​birthgap​ on real wage can be 
derived as follows: 
 Y = β​10​x + β​12​x*age + β​13​x*age​2 [6.5] 
 
 = β​10​ + β​12​age + β​13​*age​2dx
dy  [6.6] 
Thus, the marginal effect of birthgap on real wage is 
 -0.2030 + 0.0095*age - 0.0001*age​2 [6.7] 
 
for group A and 
  -0.2187 + 0.0087*age - 0.0001*age​2 [6.8] 
for group B, meaning that age has an effect on how birthgap affects the real wage. For this 
reason, we calculate the marginal effect of birthgap across different values of age.  
Table 12: Birthgap’s Marginal Effect on Real Wage Across Age 
Group A Group B 
age ME of birthgap age ME of birthgap 
min = 14 -0.0896 min = 14 -0.1165 
Quartile 1 = 23 -0.0374 Quartile 1 = 23 -0.0715 
Quartile 2 = 29 -0.0116 Quartile 2 = 28 -0.0535 
Quartile 3 = 39 -0.0154 Quartile 3 = 37 -0.0337 
max = 57 -0.0136 max = 57 -0.0477 
40 
 From the calculations, we see that birthgap’s marginal effect on the real wage is stronger 
in the beginning of a woman’s life and decreases over time. Model 7 predicts that at age 14, an 
increase of ​birthgap​ by one year will lead to a decrease in real wage by 9.7% for group A and a 
decrease of 11.3% for group B. As a mother grows older, an increase in ​birthgap​ has a gradually 
smaller effect on her real wage growth. This makes sense, since it implies that taking more time 
to give birth hurts the real wage growth more earlier in a woman’s life than later on. Later on, a 
woman is able to afford to take more time to give birth since she has established more credibility 
compared to a younger woman. 
Before we conclude this assessment of the marginal effects of ​birthgap​, we would like to 
highlight that the table excludes the age where the marginal effects of ​birthgap​ equals 0. Upon 
calculating, we found that group A’s equation [6.6] has two points of age where marginal effect 
of ​birthgap​ equals 0. Within the age of 32.458 to 62.542, ​birthgap​ actually has a positive 
marginal effect on the real wage growth. For group B, however, the marginal effect of ​birthgap 
on the real wage growth is always negative. The maximum of group B’s equation [6.6] occurs at 
age 43.5 when marginal effects of ​birthgap​ equals -0.029. 
This implies that for women who received paid leave, there may be a time in their lives 
when a higher ​birthgap​ (produced by less baby-bunching) has a positive correlation with the real 
wage growth. For women who did not receive paid leave, however, increasing ​birthgap​ is never 
associated with a higher real wage growth.  
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Chapter 7: Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The net effect of paid maternity leave on real wage growth is theoretically ambiguous. 
While paid maternity leave reduces external leave-taking (unemployment), it also increases 
internal leave-taking by subsidizing the leave and lowering opportunity costs of childbearing. 
According to the human capital theory, work interruptions are detrimental to the real wage 
growth, ceteris paribus. Whether or not to implement a paid maternity leave then depends on 
whether or not paid maternity leave reduces the negative effects of leave-taking on the real wage 
growth.  
If paid maternity leave does indeed reduce the negative effect of leave-taking on the real 
wage, then the positive effect of paid maternity leave (i.e. the reduction in external leave-taking) 
prevails over its negative effect (i.e. the increase in internal leave-taking). Empirical tests will 
help determine which of the two effects prevail in the real world.  
According to our empirical results, leave-taking has a negative effect on the real wage 
growth for both paid leave-takers (group A) and unpaid leave-takers (group B). However, the 
negative effect of leave-taking on group B is larger than for group A. Throughout six of the 
seven models for both groups, the coefficients for leave-taking (β​1A​and β​1B​)​ ​follow this pattern. 
Because of the consistently larger magnitude of β​1B​ we reject the null hypothesis stating that |β​1A​|  
equals |β​1B​|.  
Although our findings provide support for the implementation of a paid maternity leave 
policy, there are some caveats to keep in mind. We believe that implementing a paid maternity 
leave policy that targets only women will strengthen the male-breadwinner model. Under the 
male-breadwinner model, men (who do not face direct physical costs from childbearing) 
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specialize in the market labor while women (who do face the direct physical costs) specialize in 
the nonmarket labor, specifically homemaking. This decreases the financial autonomy of women, 
which will leave them at a disadvantage in the case of divorce or death of the husband. Thus, in 
this situation, adhering to societal norms could have a negative impact on women on their rainy 
days. 
We acknowledge that a paid maternity leave is necessary for physical and psychological 
effects of pushing a human being out of one’s body into the world. However, we disagree with 
focusing solely on mothers for childcare once the child is in the world. Fathers should also be the 
target of the paid leave policies. Such a change towards paternity leave should be taken in 
gradual steps as the state of New York is implementing their paid leave policy. New York 
currently in 2018 sets their benefit amount at 50% of an employee’s average weekly wage, but in 
2022, the state will set the amount at 67%. The gradual nature of the implementation will ease 
the state’s employees and employers into the paid leave policy instead of creating a shock. 
Other ways to encourage more fathers to take paternity leave is to provide the father’s 
quota of shared parental leave only on the basis that fathers must use it or the couple loses it 
completely. Research shows that even under a shared parental system, women end up taking 
more time off of work compared to their male counterparts (O’Brien 2013). Providing paternity 
leave on this use-it-or-lose-it basis will incentivize more men to be proactive in childrearing even 
if they do not do the childbearing.  
Another caveat to keep in mind is that the availability of paid leave is disproportional 
across the socioeconomic levels. The statistics summary suggest that more educated women who 
were already earning a higher wage were getting a wider access to paid leave than women who 
43 
were not earning such a high wage and not as educated. If paid leave is meant to help women, 
then the availability should be extended to beyond those who were already doing better off, 
which leads us to our next point. 
Although group B’s coefficient for ​weeksgap ​is larger in absolute value than that of group 
A, we should be careful in making conclusions about whether or not paid maternity leave hurts 
or helps mothers as a whole. Our sample was not a random sample of the whole population. Out 
of the participants from NLSY-79, we picked out the mothers. Although we used fixed effects 
generalized least squares estimators to account for this unrandom factor, this does not mean that 
we can make general conclusions about the whole planet. My empirical results may suggest that 
paid leave will help mothers, but future researchers should strive to confirm or reject my findings 
on a national level with various sets of data. 
Concerning ​birthgap​, our empirical results suggest that it may be in the interest of the 
mother to reduce ​birthgap​. Thus, the mother should baby-bunch by having the desired amount of 
babies in the shortest time biologically possible. A woman who baby-bunches, however, must 
keep in mind the health consequences of having babies consecutively, since childbearing without 
recovery time in between may affect the woman’s health negatively. The potential biological 
effects, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. The analysis also suggests that the 
baby-bunching should take place later on in a woman’s career after she has established 
credibility in her work environment, as opposed to earlier. 
With more time and more mathematical background, I would have implemented 
techniques to conduct a joint hypothesis test across the non-nested models across group A and 
group B. Despite the limitations, we created fixed effects generalized least squares estimators to 
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account for serial correlation, misspecification, and heteroskedasticity. We have tried our best to 
be as transparent as possible. In order to examine or extend on my work, please visit 
https://github.com/soehan/maternityleavethesis​ for a complete collection of my data and do-files. 
Hopefully this analysis has been helpful for those who are curious in paid maternity leave and 
similar topics. Thank you for taking the time to read this work. 
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Appendix B: Hausman Tests 
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